AFGHANISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN

The surprisingly swift military victories of Taliban forces in Afghanistan in September 1996 spurred even closer Russian-Iranian cooperation. Given that the Sunni Taliban were enemies of the Iranian-backed Shi'a forces in Afghanistan, and that the obscurantist nature of Taliban Islam embarrassed even the Iranian leadership, Iran sought to build a coalition to stop the Taliban offensive. It organized a regional conference in Tehran, which Russia attended, to address the situation. Russia's leadership, which feared that the Taliban's influence could penetrate Central Asia or even Russia itself (20 percent of whose population is Muslim), had an equally strong interest in blocking the Taliban. Consequently, the situation in Afghanistan was high on the agenda when Primakov visited Tehran in December 1996. In addition, the fact that Afghanistan, under the Taliban, soon became a haven for purveyors of opium concerned both Iran and Russia, which faced growing drug problems, and the two countries signed an agreement to fight the narcotics trade in 1999. (12)

Concerns about Afghanistan also influenced discussions on Tajikistan. Tajikistan exemplified for Russia the threat of Islamic radicalism, particularly immediately after the Soviet collapse. Ironically, the civil war in Tajikistan did not begin with a radical Islamic attempt to seize power, but rather with a loose alignment of Western-style democrats and moderate Islamists, primarily from the eastern provinces of Garm and Pamir, ousting an old-line Communist leader. When the Communists came back into power with the help of Uzbek and Soviet military forces, many Islamists fled across the border into Afghanistan, where they became radicalized, and then mounted attacks back across the border into Tajikistan.  In the process they killed some Russian soldiers guarding the Tajik border and drew Moscow into the fighting, posing a serious problem for Russian leaders who had no desire to get too deeply involved in another Afghanistan-type war in Central Asia. Under these circumstances, a diplomatic settlement of the war in Tajikistan became an important objective for Yeltsin, though some elements in the Russian Defense Ministry appeared to prefer fighting there to revenge Russia's defeat by Islamists in Afghanistan. (13)

Since many Islamic opposition leaders, including Akbar Turajanzode, had taken refuge in Iran, it became necessary to bring Iran into the diplomatic process. By spring 1994, with Iran's aid, Russia managed to get talks started between the opposing sides, though Russian troops continued to suffer casualties in the fighting along the Tajik-Afghan border. With Iran's help, Russia brokered an agreement in February 1997 between the government and rebel Islamic forces. Thus, for the time being at least, the Russian-Iranian relationship had been reinforced, though distrust remained high between the Tajik government and opposition forces and the agreement suffered a number of breakdowns. Russia and Iran continued to maintain close contact on Tajikistan. (14)

THE U.S. FACTOR

The election of Muhammad Khatami as Iran's President in May 1997 led to a shift in the Russian-Iranian relationship. President Khatami began to promote a policy of domestic reform and liberalization, and rapprochement with the Arab world, Europe, and the United States. While conservative forces in Iran did not strongly oppose improving relations with the Arab world and Europe, they opposed domestic liberalization and a rapprochement with the United States.

The rapprochement began in December 1997 with Khatami's speech on CNN offering improved relations to the American people. A subsequent speech by President Bill Clinton the next month reciprocated Khatami's offer. Gestures followed: a visit by a U.S. wrestling team to Tehran; the waiving of U.S. sanctions against French, Russian, and Malaysian companies planning to develop Iran's South Pars gas field; and a major speech by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright offering Iran a path of reconciliation. (15) Khatami, however, did not respond to the offer because of a summer 1998 conservative attack in the Majlis, which continued until the February 2000 Majlis elections.

Meanwhile, in July 1998, a successful Iranian test of its Shihab III intermediate range (1300 km) missile strengthened the position of those in the United States who called for sanctions against Russian companies that provided Iran with missile help. In December 1998, a CIA report asserted that Russian assistance had "accelerated Iranian development of the Shihab III" and that nuclear-related goods from Russia would help Iran's nuclear weapons research and development. (16) Following that report, the United States imposed sanctions in January 1999 against two major Russian institutions-the Scientific Research & Design Institute for Power Technology (Nikiet) and the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology-along with eight other Russian organizations. (17) Despite initial denials, Russia's minister for atomic energy, Yevgeny Adamov, told the New York Times in March that Russia would curtail nuclear cooperation with Iran if sanctions against Nikiet and Mendeleyev University were dropped. (18) Earlier in January, Yeltsin promised to stop selling "dual-use" technology to Iran. (19)

Russia's August 1998 financial collapse made caving it difficult to sacrifice lucrative contracts with Iran, but Moscow also recognized its need for American economic assistance. At the same time, it was concerned that the aborted rapprochement between Iran and the United States might restart and erode Russia's position in Iran, especially if Washington agreed to building oil and gas pipelines through Iran (rather than the previously U.S.-favored route through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.)

Russia's concern was also heightened by lagging progress on the Bushehr nuclear reactor project, the centerpiece of the Russian-Iranian relationship. In late November 1998, Atomic Energy Minister Adamov paid a major visit to Iran and made an agreement transforming Bushehr into a "turn-key" project in which Russian and not Iranian technicians, would build the reactor whose target date for completion was May 2003. (20) Moscow would not back off from its promises on the Bushehr project. As Sergei Karaganov, a top Russian scholar and government political advisor, frankly noted, even if Russia were to be offered alternative U.S. financial assistance, Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation would continue because the energy and nuclear field had a "very strong lobby" in Moscow. (21)

Thus, complications in U.S.-Russian relations led Russia in 1998-1999 to follow what might be termed a "minimax" policy toward Iran, trying to maintain maximum influence in Iran and at the same time minimize damage to U.S.-Russian relations.

PIPELINE POLITICS

While Russia continued its nuclear cooperation with Iran, despite its assertions otherwise, it also stepped up cooperation on Caspian Sea energy projects. Iran, whose own Caspian coastal shelf has little oil, had opposed the Russian-Kazakh agreement of July 1998 partly dividing the Caspian Sea. (22) U.S. efforts to promote the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, however, brought Iran and Russia closer together as both became increasingly concerned about Azerbaijan's and Georgia's willingness to cooperate closely with NATO, (23) a development that was reinforced by the decision at the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe in Istanbul on November 18, 1999 to move forward with the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

Perhaps even more disconcerting to both Russia and Iran was a second action at the OSCE meeting, an "intergovernmental declaration of intent" to construct a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku to transport gas to Turkey. (24) Moscow had hoped to become Turkey's main natural gas supplier through the "Blue Stream" gas pipeline, while Iran had hoped to supply Turkey with Turkmen gas through its own pipelines. Iran not only wanted Caspian oil and natural gas to pass through its territory to foreign markets--rather than through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey--but it also feared that the two projects would strengthen Azerbaijan.

Consequently, soon after the OSCE agreements were signed, Russia and Iran sought to undermine the economic rationale for the projects. The Russian gas company, Gasprom, suddenly-perhaps at the urging of the Russian government-reached an agreement with Turkmenistan in December 1999, after two years of haggling, to buy Turkmen natural gas at $36 per 1,000 cubic meters, and to purchase a large share of Turkmenistan's gas in the year 2000. The aim was to deter Turkmenistan from moving ahead rapidly with the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. (25) In an effort to persuade major oil companies not to proceed with Baku-Ceyhan, Iran cut the cost of its oil swaps with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan by 30 percent, beginning in the year 2000. As Iran's deputy oil minister for international affairs, Mehdi Hosseini, frankly stated, "The reduction would give Iran the upper hand in competing with 'political alternatives' for the export of Caspian crude." (26)

Yet, while Iran and Russia were acting in concert to stop both the Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian pipelines, their long-run interests in Caspian energy resources differed. Moscow wanted transport routes to pass through Russia to help it control the states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Iran, on the other hand, continued to profess-with support from a number of foreign oil and gas companies-that it could provide the cheapest and safest route for the shipment of Caspian oil and natural gas. As Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated: "We believe in diversity of routes for the transfer of energy, but consider Iran as the best route to the south, east and west." (27) Still, in the short run at least, Moscow and Tehran cooperated on the Caspian issue and both benefited from the sharp rise in oil prices that took place in 1999 that was made possible by increased cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.

KOSOVO AND CHECHNYA

While Russia and Iran's interests coincided on the issues of nuclear cooperation and obstructing the Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian pipelines, they clashed over the second Chechen war, which began in August 1999. Unlike the situation during the first Chechen war (1994-1996), Iran headed the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1999 and purported to seek the welfare of Muslims everywhere. Thus, for example, Iran urged the United States and Britain to halt the bombing of Iraq before Ramadan began in late December 1998.

Despite the fact that they backed different sides during the Kosovo fighting, Russia and Iran maintained good relations. But, as reports of Russian soldiers massacring Chechen civilians began to leak out, Iran found itself in a dilemma, having to weight its financial and military interests in Russia against its position in the OIC, which demanded that it speak out against the killing of Chechen Muslims. Consequently, while emphasizing that Chechnya was an internal Russian affair, Iran gradually increased its criticism of Moscow's behavior. Moscow, in turn, became increasingly critical of Iran, though both sides sought to play down their conflict. Thus, as fighting intensified in September 1999, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, Hamid Rega Assefi, stated: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, while honoring Russia's territorial integrity, does not regard violent and hostile acts as a suitable way of dealing with recent incidents in Chechnya and Daghestan. The government and people of Iran cannot but deplore the continued armed operation by the Russian troops in the Northern Caucasus." (28) When Iran offered its help to settle the crisis peacefully, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov replied on October 12: "We are concerned over the attitude of Islamic countries to the events in Chechnya. However, it is a domestic Russian problem, and we intend to settle it independently, without any aid or interference." (29)

Moscow stepped up its criticism of Iran in November, listing it, along with other states, as a country suspected of aiding the Chechens. (30) Indeed, Moscow was already on record as warning the OIC not to help the Chechen rebels. As Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov had pointedly noted: "It is clear that any form of support for the terrorists' actions will be viewed as rude interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation, with all the logical consequences. (31) Nonetheless, as the war intensified, Moscow allowed a visit of OIC representatives, led by Iran, to Russia and the North Caucasus in December, and also permitted Muslim states to send humanitarian aid to the Chechen refugees. While the OIC delegation kept its criticism of Moscow relatively low-key, it noted that the military operations were "disproportionate" to the acts of violence that provoked them. The delegation also bemoaned the massive loss of life that had taken place. (32)

When the fighting continued through Ramadan, Iran's criticism increased, and Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, after leading another OIC mission to Moscow, told visiting Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin in January 2000 that the continued catastrophe in Chechnya was "unacceptable to the Muslim world and that it would bring an unpleasant picture from Russia to the region and the Muslim world." (33) He called upon Russia to stop the military operation in Chechnya and solve the crisis solely through political means. Karasin, in response, thanked Iran for its efforts to bring an end to the Chechen crisis and for the humanitarian assistance it had delivered to Chechen refugees. He stated that Russia would launch a political drive to resolve the Chechen crisis. (34) In some Muslims' view, Iran's criticism of Moscow was not strong enough. A January 27, 2000 editorial in the Saudi-owned London daily al-Sharq al-Awsat stated that Kharazi was guilty of "stabbing the Chechen Republic in the back" by continuing to insist that the Chechen war was an internal Russian affair. (35)

It is clear that Russian-Iranian relations have been damaged by the Chechen war, and the damage may grow worse if the war continues and Muslim casualties mount. Russia, however, was pleased that U.S.-Iranian relations did not improve during this period, despite U.S. criticism of Russian behavior in Chechnya, the lifting of U.S. sanctions on food and medicine sales to Iran, and the U.S. labeling the Iraq-based anti-Iranian National Council of Resistance (that launched a mortar attack against the presidential palace in Tehran in February 2000) a terrorist organization. (36) Khatami was not in a position to begin the political dialogue that Washington sought, or even to allow U.S. diplomats to conduct consular visits as the United States had requested.

Compounding the problems was a statement by U.S. officials indicating that Iran might have been behind the 1996 bombing of the U.S. air force barracks, Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia, as well as the condemnation by Secretary of State Madeline Albright of the arrest of 13 Iranian Jews on charges of spying for Israel. (37) Indeed, Iran's conservative forces, if not behind the arrests, quickly sought to exploit the resulting negative effect that threatened to further weaken U.S.-Iranian relations. A June 1999 editorial in the anti-Khatami newspaper Jomhuri Islami stated: "Washington's support of the spies shows that the United States is still the enemy of the Iranian people and this should be a lesson for all those in Iran who support a normalization of relations with the United States." (38)

As the internal struggle in Iran continued, the conservative side tried to use the July 1999 student riots in Tehran to pressure Khatami to take a tougher stand. Khatami was compelled to condemn the rioters, calling them "counter-revolutionaries supported from abroad." (39) Conservative forces also used the trial of former interior minister Abdullah Nouri to attack advocates of rapprochement with the United States by noting that an article in Nouri's newspaper had recommended re-establishing relations with the United States. (40)

On November 3, 1999, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme religious leader, at a rally commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy, claimed there was in Iran, "a small but active minority [for whom] the dictates of Islam are not important" and who worked for the United States against Iran's interests. Khamenei added that "the problem [in U.S.-Iranian relations] was that Iran is the biggest and most important center of confrontation with Israel." (41) Despite this rebuff, and new charges that Iran was increasing aid to terrorist groups, (42) President Clinton permitted Boeing to provide kits to Iran to prevent engines from falling off Boeing 747s in flight, (43) Still, Iran's foreign minister Kharrazi, in early January 2000, stated: "We don't find it serious or acceptable to engage in dialogue with the United States."(44)

Since the Majlis elections resulted in a big victory for Khatami's supporters, U.S.-Iran détente efforts could restart, potentially undermining Russia's positions there. Still,  the once very close Russian-Iranian relationship had already begun to erode because of the Chechen war.

CONCLUSION

Despite some areas of friction, the Russian-Iranian relationship proved beneficial to both countries during the 1991-2000 period, though the future of relations is an open question. From Russia's standpoint, Iran (despite occasional problems paying its debts) is an excellent arms client and market for nuclear reactors. It has also been an ally against what Moscow has called "U.S. hegemony" as Russian-American relations deteriorated;  in helping to bring at least a limited peace in Tajikistan; in confronting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; and in containing Azerbaijan. At a time when Russia has not fully recovered from the August 1998 economic crisis, with its armed forces (especially its navy) very weak, having Iran as an ally makes excellent diplomatic sense, since an independent Iran helps prevent the United States from fully dominating the Persian Gulf, where Moscow has important interests.

From Iran's point of view, Russia is a secure source of sophisticated arms; a diplomatic ally at a time when the United States has sought to isolate it; an ally in helping to curb Azerbaijan's possible irridentist threat; and an ally in helping stem the terrorist threat and drug flow from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Yet, as good as relations were until the very end of the Yeltsin regime, the relationship may weaken. First, Russia's crackdown on Chechnya has become a serious irritant in the relationship. Second, Iran continues to position itself as a rival for transporting Caspian oil and natural gas, which may develop into serious conflict, particularly in the case of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Finally, should the West help Iran's economy recover while Russia's economy continues to stagnate, Iran may find its Russian connection less attractive. Indeed, Iran's brisk trade with some of Russia's southern provinces may exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies already present in the Russian Federation.  The result could be that Russia may see not only Central Asia and Transcaucasia gravitating toward Iran, but perhaps some of its own provinces as well.