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Abstract: Iran is Russia's most important ally in the Middle East. Moscow supplies Tehran with arms and nuclear reactors. They are allies against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as well as in countering Azerbaijan and Turkey. Russia has also helped Iran's efforts to evade and eliminate the U.S.-led efforts to isolate that country. Yet the election of Iranian president Muhammad Khatami in May 1997 and his subsequent efforts at rapprochement with the United States, as well as the second Russian invasion of Chechnya, have begun to threaten

RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 

By Robert O. Freedman*

(professor of political science)

One of the most striking changes in Russia's foreign policy, as compared to that of the former Soviet Union, has been a revision of its regional priorities. With the Soviet breakup, the newly independent states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia have become a central focus of Russian policymakers trying to regain control of that area. Given these states' importance and their ties to Turkey and Iran, Russia has tended to view the Middle East through the lens of its policy toward Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

Of all the states in the Middle East, perhaps none is more important to Russia than Iran. Iran's strategic location on the Persian Gulf, its importance as a trading partner, and its ties and interests in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia have all drawn Moscow's close attention.

There were some differences between the two states, for example Russian misgivings over some Iranian circles' call for spreading Islamic radicalism, and Iran's offer to transport energy resources from the Central Asia and the trans-Caucasus as an alternative to Russia. Nevertheless, the regime of Russian President Boris Yeltsin valued Iran as an important market for Russian arms and nuclear reactors, and as a way to demonstrate independence from the United States. The two countries also shared an interest in checking Turkey's influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in opposing Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and in containing Azerbaijani irredentism and independence. In addition, Iran needed Russia's diplomatic aid in the face of U.S. isolation.

Yet following the election of Mohammad Khatami as Iran's president in May 1997, Russia had to confront the possibility of a rapprochement between Iran and the United States, a process that began in late 1997.  Although the thaw in relations was aborted in the summer of 1998 by open conflict between the reform-minded Khatami and Iranian conservatives, the continued possibility of rapprochement presented a problem for Russian policymakers who feared a diminution of their influence in Iran, particularly as the war in Chechnya began to erode the Russian-Iranian relationship.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: PROCESSES AND PRIORITIES

The impact of domestic politics on Russia's policy toward the Middle East was clearly illustrated by the shift from an initially strong pro-Western tilt in 1992 to a highly nationalist thrust by the end of 1999. In part, this was a reactive change to challenges from the Russian Parliament, where three main groups of legislator vied for power.

One group supported Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy, which included good ties with Israel, sanctions against Iraq, and cooperative relations with the countries in the "near abroad"-the former Soviet republics where 25 million Russian still live-along with his efforts to reform and privatize the Russian economy.

A second group advocated a "Eurasian" emphasis in foreign policy, which would not focus exclusively on the United States and Western Europe, but rather on good ties with the Middle East (including both Israel and Iran), China, as well as other areas of the world. This group also promoted closer ties with the "near abroad." On domestic policy, the Eurasianists, while still in favor of reform, advocated a far slower process of privatization.

The third group comprised a combination of old-line Communists and ultra-nationalists. Though differing on economic policy, the two groups wanted a powerful, highly centralized Russia. They wanted this state to act like a major world power and adopt a confrontational approach toward the United States, which they saw as Russia's main enemy, as well as toward Israel. In this context, they proposed renewing close ties with Moscow's former Middle East allies such as Iraq, and reinforce ties with Iran. Finally, this third group also advocated re-establishing Moscow's dominance over the "near abroad." (1) Yeltsin's had to fight a steady movement toward a more nationalist and anti-American position in the Duma until his resignation as president on January 1, 2000.

DISCORDANT VOICES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

While Yeltsin set the overall tone for Russian policy toward Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, several other autonomous and semi-autonomous actors were also assertive in charting Russia's course. This plurlalism tended to complicate Russian foreign policymaking, particularly when a direct clash occurs between the independent actor and the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The eight key actors in Russian foreign policy were:
a)Yeltsin himself and the presidential office staff;
b)The Foreign Ministry;
c)Energy conglomerates such as Lukoil, Gasprom, and Transneft which had close ties to Russia's business and banking communities;
d)The Defense Ministry;
e)The atomic energy ministry;
f)The ministry of foreign economic relations;
g)The Rosvooruzheniye state-owned arms exporting company, and;
h)The oligarchs who, from time to time, had close ties to reformist elements in the Duma. (2)

In commenting rather caustically on the lack of order in Russian foreign policymaking, the Russian periodical Kommersant noted: "It is impossible to pursue an integrated foreign and foreign economic policy today [in part] because Russia's political and economic elite, including its ruling elite, not only is not consolidated, but has split into competing, hostile factions, groups and groupings that are openly battling each other. It would be simply foolish for our foreign partners not to take advantage of this circumstance at any talks with Moscow." (3)

Perhaps Lukoil is the leading example of independent foreign policymaking in Russia.  Owned in part (8 percent) by the American oil company ARCO, Lukoil came into direct conflict with the Russian Foreign Ministry in 1994, when the latter claimed that none of the five Caspian Sea littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) could act independently in developing Caspian oil. When Lukoil signed an agreement with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company to develop oil resources in the Caspian, it explicitly recognized Azerbaijan's right to extract oil in its sector of the sea. Problems arose again in March 1996 when Lukoil joined Chevron and Mobil in a consortium to build an oil pipeline from the Tenghis oilfield in Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossisk. Kazakhstan, like Azerbaijan, claims the right to independently extract oil from its sector of the Caspian, and its previous efforts to market its oil had been stymied by Russia's control of transport pipelines.

Another example of independent foreign policymaking is the Russian Defense Ministry, which during both Chechen wars and also in Tajikistan, formulated its own policy, often at cross purposes with that of the Foreign Ministry and the president.

The Russian atomic energy ministry, led by Viktor Mikhailov until 1997 and then by Yevgeny Adamov, has also been a maverick. Mikhailov, who was elevated to the Russian Security Council, wanted to go considerably farther than Yeltsin in selling nuclear reactors to Iran including a gas centrifuge system that could clearly enable Iran to produce nuclear weapons. On Iranian policy, however, it was not only Yeltsin and Mikhailov who appeared to differ. (4) In December 1996, just as Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on a very successful visit to Iran, hailing Russian-Iranian cooperation, Russia's then defense minister, Igor Radionov, warned that Iran was a potential military threat to Russia. (5)

In sum, these discordant voices and actions of quasi-independent Russian policymakers have seriously complicated Russian policy in the Middle East, and may have raised questions in Tehran as well as to who was running Russian foreign policy.

PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Russian relations with Turkey and Iran are of prime importance for Moscow, particularly in view of these countries' influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia and the potential threat they pose to Russia's influence in those regions.

The oil-rich and strategically important Persian Gulf is also high on Russia's list of priority regions. Moscow has sought, though not always successfully, to balance its policy among Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, whose inter-relations have usually been marked by deep hostility.

The third priority, now of far less importance, is the central Arab-Israeli zone composed of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian entity. During most of the Soviet period, Moscow focused on this region in seeking to construct an alliance based on Arab hostility to what the USSR called the "linchpin" of Western imperialism-Israel. Although relations have been strained over Russian supply of nuclear reactors and missile technology to Iran, Moscow sees Israel as its closest friend in this sub-region. Israel is Russia's major trading partner among these states, there has been military production cooperation, and the more than 900,000 Israeli citizens who emigrated from the Soviet Union create a major cultural bond between Russia and Israel. In addition, close Russian-Israeli ties enable Russia to play at least a symbolic, if not substantive, role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. (6)

Finally, Turkey plays a special role for Russian policy in the Middle East. Not only is it Russia's main economic partner in the area and an increasingly important actor in regional politics, it is also a rival to Russia's position in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS

The Russian-Iranian rapprochement began in the latter part of the Gorbachev era. After alternatively supporting first Iran and then Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, Gorbachev had clearly tilted toward Iran by July 1987. The two states solidified their ties in June 1989 when Iran's president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, visited Moscow and concluded a number of major agreements, including one on military cooperation. The military agreement permitted Iran to purchase highly sophisticated military aircraft from Moscow, including MIG-29s and SU-24s. At the time, Iran desperately needed Soviet military equipment as its air fleet had been badly eroded by the eight-year war with Iraq and it could not request spare parts, let alone new planes, from the United States. (7)

Iran's military dependence on Moscow grew as a result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The United States, Iran's main enemy, become the primary military power in the Gulf, obtaining defensive agreements with several GCC states that included pre-positioning arrangements for U.S. military equipment. Saudi Arabia, Iran's most important Islamic challenger, also acquired massive amounts of U.S. weaponry. In addition, while the war left Iraq badly damaged, its oil wealth could provide a quick military recovery if sanctions were lifted.

The war in Afghanistan, to Iran's northeast, continued despite the Soviet withdrawal, with Shi'a forces backed by Iran taking heavy losses. To the north, the  USSR's collapse presented both opportunity and danger for Iran. On one hand, for example, Iran had the chance to export its influence to six new Muslim states (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). But Iran was also challenged by some factors. In Azerbaijan, the Popular Front, which ruled in 1992-1993, urged the unification of that country with Iran's Azerbaijan area. Iran faces a similar, if far less serious problem, with Turkmenistan, whose natural gas resources might make it an irredentist attraction for Turkmens living in northeastern Iran.)

Given Iran's need for sophisticated arms, Rafsanjani was careful not to alienate either the Soviet Union or Russia during his term as president. Thus, when Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991, Iran--unlike Turkey--did not recognize its independence until after the USSR collapsed. Similarly, despite occasional rhetoric from Iranian officials, Rafsanjani ensured that Iran kept a relatively low Islamic profile in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, emphasizing cultural and economic ties rather than Islam as the centerpiece of relations. This was due in part to the fact that after more than 70 years of Soviet rule, Islam was weak in those places; leaders of the mew states were all secular, and chances for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution were very low. Indeed, some skeptics argued that Iran was simply waiting for mosques to be built and Islam to mature before trying to bring about Islamic revolutions. (8)

Nonetheless, the Russian leadership believed that Iran was basically acting very responsibly in Central Asia and Transcaucasia and was thus ready to continue supplying Tehran with modern weaponry-including submarines-despite strong protests from the United States.  Iran's low-key reaction toward the first Muslim insurgency in Chechnya (1994-1996) and toward Russia's pro-Serb and anti-Muslim policy in Bosnia in 1993-1995 helped cement relations further.

During 1992, Yeltsin's honeymoon year with the United States--when he and Washington agreed on virtually all Middle East issues aside from Iran--the two countries clashed over Russian arms shipments to Iran. Iraq and Libya were under UN sanctions, while Syria lacked the hard currency to pay for weapons and already owed Russia some $10 billion. In contrast, Iran could supply Russia with badly needed hard currency.

In addition, despite Yeltsin's cultivation of the United States, there were a number of influential Moscow figures such as Yevgeny Primakov, then chief of one of Russia's intelligence branches, advocating a more independent Russian policy in the Middle East. Given that the United States did not have relations with Iran or Iraq, Russia could fill the diplomatic vacuum in both states. Furthermore, unlike Iraq or Libya, America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained extensive economic ties with Iran, though the Salmon Rushdie affair and the murder of Iranian exiles in Western Europe somewhat damaged political relations.

Thus, Russia had a certain amount of diplomatic cover for its dealings with Iran.  Consequently, as Yeltsin came under fire from increasingly vocal members of parliament in 1993 and 1994 for being too subservient to the United States, he could point to American criticism of his policy toward Iran-which by 1993 included a promise to sell nuclear reactors-to demonstrate his independence.  Indeed, one of the central issues of contention in the May 1995 Moscow summit between Clinton and Yeltsin was Russia's January 1995 decision to sell nuclear reactors that Washington claimed would speed Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yeltsin refused to back down in the face of U.S. pressures. But he did agree to cancel a proposed gas centrifuge sale to Iran--initially approved by Russia's atomic energy ministry--which might have aided Iran's nuclear proliferation, something very few Russians, including Yeltsin, wanted. Nonetheless, the Russians regularly asserted that U.S. opposition to the sale of nuclear reactors was due to commercial jealousy, not to any genuine fear of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

By the summer of 1995, Russia and Iran embarked on what the Russian ambassador there had begun to call a strategic relationship. With the first Chechen war raging and Washington now calling for NATO expansion, Russian nationalists looked to a closer relationship with Iran as a counterbalance. As an article in the newspaper Segodnia in May 1995 noted:

"Cooperation with Iran is more than just a question of money and orders for the Russian atomic industry. Today a hostile Tehran could cause a great deal of unpleasantness for Russia in the North Caucasus and in Tajikistan if it were to really set its mind to supporting the Muslim insurgents with weapons, money and volunteers. On the other hand, a friendly Iran could become an important strategic ally in the future.

  "NATO's expansion eastward is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. In this situation, the anti- Western and anti-American regime in Iran would be a natural and very important partner. Armed with Russian weapons, including the latest types of sea mines, torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, Iran could, if necessary, completely halt the passage of tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, thereby dealing a serious blow to the haughty West in a very sensitive spot. If, in such a crisis, Russian fighter planes and anti-aircraft missile complexes were to shield Iran from retaliatory strikes by American carrier-based aircraft and cruise missiles, it would be extremely difficult to 'open' the Gulf without getting into a large-scale and very costly ground war." (9)

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited Moscow in March 1996 where he stated that Iranian-Russian relations were "at their highest level in contemporary history." (10)  While in Moscow, he joined Primakov in opposing NATO's eastward expansion, while also emphasizing that Iran was interested in prolonging the recently concluded truce in Tajikistan and developing cooperation in the Caspian oil shelf zone.

Russian-Iranian economic and military relations continued to develop with reports of Russian plans to sell Iran $4 billion of military and other equipment between 1997 and 2007 if Iran met its financial obligations-a provision that may have been inserted because of low oil prices and Iran's weak economy. (11)

Part2 conintue from here