TEXT OF THE MITCHELL REPORT
[Source:  Ha'aretz
http://www2.haaretz.co.il/breaking-news/Intifada/362927.stm }

INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf
of the participants (the government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the United Nations,
and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated that:

The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well
as in consultation with the United States Secretary General, a committee of
fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent
their recurrence.

On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants,
the president asked us to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm
el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee.

After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end
to all violence. Our meetings and our observations during our subsequent
visits to the region have intensified our convictions in this regard. It
will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but
will deepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only
one way to bring peace, justice and security in the Middle East, and that is
through negotiation.

Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and
Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each other's concerns. Some
Israelis appear not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that
Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the continuing
effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces
and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to
achieve independence and genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians
appear not to comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates fear among
the Israeli people and undermines their belief in the possibility of
co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever is necessary to
protect its people.

Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest
danger of all that the culture of peace, nurtured over the past decade is
being shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and
despair, and a growing resort to violence.

Two proud people share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and
religious differences have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing
conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way
to live side-by-side in peace.

So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed
in completing their journey to their common destination, agreed commitments
must be implemented, international law respected, and human rights
protected. We encourage them to return to negotiation, however difficult. It
is the only path to peace, justice and security.


DISCUSSION
The violence has not ended (since the Sharm el-Sheikh summit). It has
worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the region with whom we
spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a
sustainable peace.

Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal
with the situation that exists, which is different from that envisaged by
the summit participants. In this report, we will try to answer the questions
assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why did it
happen?

In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third
part of our mandate: How can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The
relevance and impact of our work, in the end, will be measured by the
recommendations we make concerning the following:
+ Ending the Violence
+ Rebuilding Confidence
+ Resuming Negotiations

WHAT HAPPENED?

We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we do not determine
the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties.

In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received
reports that Member of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was
planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to
prohibit the visit. Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was
intended to be an internal political act directed against him by a political
opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.

Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli
police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political
context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the following
day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators
and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According to
the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and
threw stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used
rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the
demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200." According to the
GOI, 14 policemen were injured.

Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days. Thus
began what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a
mosque at the Haram al- Sharif/Temple Mount).

The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the
breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the
"widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian
responsibility for the impasse." In this view, Palestinian violence was
planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring
Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the
Intifada was planned. It claims, however, that "Camp David represented
nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on
the ground to negotiations."

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with
excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior
which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and
safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of Muhammad
al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father,
reinforced that perception.

From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and
directed by the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause
around the world by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon
demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of two
military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef
Avrahani, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian
hatred of Israel and Jews.

What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators
and Israeli security forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial
restrictions of the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions
and responses.

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation
and degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided with
no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an
internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence
that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a
deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first
opportunity; or to conclude that there was a delilberate plan by the GOI to
respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a
consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence
once it began; or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal
means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger,
fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted
accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly
timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed, it was
foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant
were the events that followed: The decision of the Israeli police on
September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and
the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise
restraint.

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive
summit conference. Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment
with the behavior of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising
from the peace process.

Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations
expressed by the parties in relating to the implementation of the Oslo
process. Results achieved from this process were unthinkable less than 10
years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer
to a permanent settlement than ever before.

Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israeli alike told us that the premise on
which the Oslo process is based - that tackling the hard "permanent status"
issues be deferred to the end of the process - has gradually come under
serious pressure.

The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in
a nonviolent atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the
agreements between the parties.

The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an
Israeli attempt to prolong and solidify the occupation. "In sum, Israel's
proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation of the best
Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem,
a continued military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli control over
Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders, and the return of fewer
than 1% of refugees to their homes."

Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the
opening of the peace process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This
conclusion led to an erosion of trust even before the permanent status
negotiations began.

Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have
hardened into divergent realities. Each side views the other as having acted
in bad faith; as having turned the optimism of Oslo into suffering and grief
of victims and their loved ones. In their statements and actions, each side
demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in the
perspective of the other.

The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo"
heralded the prospect of a state, and guaranteed an end to the occupation
and a resolution of outstanding matters within an agreed time. Palestinians
are genuinely angry at the continued growth of settlements and at their
daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's
presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and
settlements in their midst not only as violating the spirit of the Oslo
process, but also as application of force in the form of Israel's
overwhelming military superiority.

The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other
commitments, such as the further withdrawal from the West Bank and the
release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition, Palestinians expressed
frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic
circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of
settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate the convenience
and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome of permanent status
negotiations.

Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during
subsequent talks, the GOI offered to make significant concessions with
respect to the settlements in the context of an overall agreement.

Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO
has breached its solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the
pursuit of political objectives.

According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes on several forms:
Institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from
detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the
actual conduct of violent operations. The GOI maintains that the PLO has
significantly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of
violence, thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties.

END THE VIOLENCE

For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past seven months
has been intensely personal. We were touched by their stories. Israeli and
Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.

With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of each
other in hostile stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without
considerable determination and readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of
trust will be impossible.

Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed
themselves, in all their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. To stop the
violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the wheel." Rather they
should take immediate steps to end the violence, reaffirm their mutual
commitments, and resume negotiations.

Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us
that it would take some time for the PA to reassert full control over armed
elements nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over
other armed elements operating in Palestinian area. Israeli security
officials have not disputed these assertions. What is important is that the
PA make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and
that it be clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise
exercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential friction points,
where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do not become
stages for renewed hostilities.

The collapse of the security cooperation in early October reflected the
belief by each party that the other had committed itself to a violent course
of action. If parties wish to attain the standard of 100 percent effort to
prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security cooperation is
mandatory.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE

The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister
Rabin at the White House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of
both parties that the door to the peaceful resolution of differences had
been opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust, both
communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this
desire into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of
trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this
end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence
of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the
parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.

Terrorism: In September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged
to take action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence, or
incitement."

Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected
noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by
spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population.

In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of
supporting terrorism by releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA
security personnel to abet, and in some cases to conduct terrorist
operations, and by terminating security cooperation the GOI. The PA
vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's
leadership has made no real effort to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The
belief that is, in and of itself, it is a major obstacle to the rebuilding
of confidence.

We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by
making it clear to both communities that terrorism is reprehensible and
unacceptable, and by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and
to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A
cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to
sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction activity.
Settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the restoration of
calm and the resumption of negotiations.

On each of our two visits to the region, there were Israeli announcements
regarding expansion of settlements, and it was almost always the first issue
raised by Palestinians with whom we met. The GOI describes its policy as
prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of existing settlements
to accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no
distinction between "new" and "expanded" settlements; and that, except for a
brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there has
been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and
size of settlements.

Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that
emotions generated by the many recent deaths and funerals have fueled
additional confrontations, and, in effect, maintained the cycle of violence.
Both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not be
tolerated. We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for
human life when demonstrators confront security personnel.

Actions and Responses: For the first three months of the current uprising,
most incidents did not involve Palestinian use of firearms and explosives.
Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured over the
past seven months; the overwhelming majority in both categories were
Palestinian.

Israel's characterization of the conflict, as "armed conflict short of war,"
does not adequately describe the variety of incidents reported since late
September 2000. Moreover, by thus defining the conflict, the IDF has
suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the Department of
Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories
dies at the hands of an IDF soldier in an incident not involving terrorism.

Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls "the
targeting of individual enemy combatants." The PLO describes these actions
as "extra-judicial" that is "in clear violation of Article 32 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.." The GOI states that, "whatever action Israel has taken
has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted
principles relating to the conduct of hostilities."

We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of
fire between populated areas. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms
fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or
adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering
innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the positioning
of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings. We urge that such provocations
cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in its responses if they
do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often lead to escalation.

On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas
of responsibility and accountability. We urge the PA to take all necessary
steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed
personnel operating under its authority.

Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides
expressed concerns about hateful language and images emanating from the
other. We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster
mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement and
hostile propaganda.

Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the movement
of people and goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. These closures take the three forms: Those which restrict
movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those which restrict
movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict movement
from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures have
disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.

Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security
forces and settlers of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other
agricultural property. The closures have also had other adverse effects.

We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI
should lift closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs.
Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their
constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian
workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to
terrorist organizations.

Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that the places such as the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and
Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence, death and
injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must be
accessible to all believers. Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and
Christians merit respect, protection and preservation.

International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during
our inquiry was the issue of deploying an international force to the
Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of having such a force to
protect Palestinian civilians and their property. The GOI is just as
adamantly opposed to an "international protection force," believing it would
prove unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral
negotiations to settle the conflict. We believe that to be effective such a
force would need the support of both parties.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence."
Palestinian leaders do not wish to be perceived as " rewarding occupation."
We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both sides.
Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for
peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating
both security cooperation and negotiations.

We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political
objectives. Yet the construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying
and transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires intelligent
risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be
willing to regard the other as a partner.

To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have
stated that they remain committed to their mutual agreements and
undertakings. It is time to explore further implementation. The parties
should declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume
full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at
Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.


RECOMMENDATIONS
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence.
Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume
negotiations.

END THE VIOLENCE

+ The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements
and undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation
of violence.

+ The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.

Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage
the resumption of negotiations. We believe that the security cooperation
cannot long be sustained if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably
deferred, if security measures "on the ground" are seen as hostile, or if
steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the
outcome of negotiations.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE

+ The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off
period" and implement additional confidence building measures.

+ The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and
discourage incitement in all its forms.

+ The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and
Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that
the PA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend
and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

+ The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural
growth" of existing settlements. The kind of security cooperation desired by
the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement activity.

* The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are
focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for
future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of
productive talks.

* The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose
no threat to the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian state to be
established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

+ The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28,
2000 which will reduce the number of friction points and the potential for
violent confrontations.

+ The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and
procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a
view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.

+ The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed,
and permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their
jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural
property in Palestinian areas.

+ The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure,
to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within
Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.

+ The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to
fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places
civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.

+ The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed
to ensure that the response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian
civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of the gunmen
to elicit an excessive IDF response.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

+ We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an
immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence
building measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet
none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to serious
negotiations.

It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda
of negotiations. However, in order to provide an effective political context
for practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations must not be
unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a spirit of
compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of
the past seven months.

George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate

Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the Republic of Turkey

Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway

Warren B. Rudman
Former Member of the United States Senate

Javier Solana
High European Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
European Union


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