ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND NUCLEAR WAR
Louis Rene Beres
Professor of Political Science and International Law
Purdue University
West Lafayette IN 47907
USA
FAX 765 494-0833
TEL 765 494-4189
E MAIL BERES@POLSCI.PURDUE.EDU
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Some subjects should be approached with fear and trembling. One such
subject concerns nuclear war in the Middle East. Because the impending
creation of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel will heighten
this prospect considerably, ongoing Arab militarization in that unsteady
region should be viewed with a unique kind of apprehension.
Architects of the Oslo Agreements suggest, of course, that a
"two-state solution" to the Palestinian problem will substantially reduce
the risk of another major war in the Middle East. After all, we are told,
this problem of stateless Palestinians is the source of all other problems
between Israel and the Arabs. Once we have "justice" for Palestinians, the
argument proceeds, Arab governments and Iran will begin to create
area-wide stability and comprehensive peace settlements. Harmony shall
then reign, more or less triumphantly, from the Mediterranean and Red Seas
to the Persian Gulf.
But as we should have learned by now, especially from recurring Arab
violations of a "peace process," the conventional Oslo wisdom is unwise.
For the most part, Iranian and Arab state inclinations to war against
Israel have absolutely nothing to do with the Palestinians. Even if Israel
were to make all unilateral Oslo concessions, and continue to adhere to
unreciprocated agreements, these belligerent inclinations would continue,
especially from Syria, Iraq and Libya as well as for Iran and Egypt. Indeed,
as Israel will soon coexist with a new state of Palestine, the Jewish
state's vulnerability to armed attack by hostile neighbors will increase
markedly. And if this diminished safety is accompanied by the spread of
unconventional weapons to hostile states, which now seems inevitable,
Israel could find itself confronting not only war, but genocide.
Why? Most importantly, the new state of Palestine will preoccupy
Israeli military forces to a much greater extent - much, much greater -
than did the intifada. Even if it were able to resist takeover by one of the
other Islamic states in the region, a takeover accomplished either directly
or by insurgent surrogates, Palestine would inevitably become a favored
launching-point for renewed (possibly even unconventional) terrorism
against Israel. Various promises notwithstanding, Islamic insurgents would
continue to celebrate violence against Israel as the essence of "national
liberation."
Recognizing an "improved" configuration of forces vis-a-vis Israel, a
larger number of enemy states would calculate that they now confront a
smaller, more beleaguered adversary. Further, they would understand that
a coordinated effort by certain countries that possess or are in the
process of acquiring pertinent ballistic missiles could possibly endanger
Israel's very survival. Taken together with the fact that global support
for Israel is always fickle, and that individual or combined
chemical/biological/nuclear warfare capabilities could bring enormous harm
to Israel, the creation of Palestine will tip the balance of power in the
Middle East decisively. In view of this incontestable assessment, it is
more than a little ironic that certain prominent Israelis, including even
former Prime Minister Peres, are currently lobbying for a Palestinian
state.
The full strategic implications for Israel of an independent Palestine
should now be carefully appraised. If, in the end, such independence
becomes the cause of a nuclear war in the region, everyone, Palestinians as
well as Jews, will lose. But how, exactly, would a nuclear war begin in the
reconfigured Middle East? One possibility would be by Arab or Iranian first
strikes against Israel. These strikes could be nuclear (although this would
likely be several years away) or nonnuclear. In either scenario, Israel -
especially if it feels perilously close to defeat - might resort to nuclear
retaliation.
Alternatively, Israel, believing that substantial enemy attack
-chemical, biological, conventional, or nuclear - is imminent, could decide to
preempt. If, as we might expect, this preemption were entirely nonnuclear,
it could still fail to prevent the anticipated attack against Israel. Here,
Israeli nuclear weapons, having failed in their mission to support
conventional preemption by deterring enemy retaliation, might also have to
be used for purposes of nuclear warfighting.
Israel has much to fear, more - perhaps - than any other state on the
face of the earth. Threatened by a growing number of adversaries with
ballistic missiles and with a corollary interest in nuclear warheads,
Jerusalem knows that transformation of Judea/Samaria and Gaza into
Palestine could provide its enemies with the means and the incentives to
destroy the Jewish State once and for all. Deprived of essential
"strategic depth," Israel could become seriously vulnerable to total
defeat. Anguished by a possible end to the Third Temple Commonwealth, the
nation's leaders would begin to think seriously about nuclear weapons as a
last resort (the so-called "Samson Option"). It follows that however
disturbing and problematic Israel's control of what remains of
Judea/Samaria may be for the Arabs and for Iran, and however costly
recovery of already surrendered "West Bank" lands would be for the Jewish
State, the emergence of Palestinian statehood should be viewed with
altogether grave concern. Otherwise, Palestine, looking first very much
like Lebanon, could wind up as Armageddon, a metamorphosis that would
favor neither Israeli nor Palestinian.
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LOUIS RENE BERES (Ph.D. Princeton) is the author of SECURITY OR
ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Lexington Books, 1986) and many
other major books and articles on nuclear weapons and nuclear war. His
work is well-known to Israel's military and intelligence communities.