Presented by Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto

Before The

Joint Economic Committee

October 21, 1997

Executive Summary

Background

That the Sinai be demilitarized, and the southbound Israeli shipping through the Red Sea unhindered, as was agreed in 1957 at the end of the Sinai Campaign, in a U.S. brokered Cease Fire agreement.

That the U.S. will honor the obligation it undertook to guarantee the said passage and demilitarization, backed by U.N. troops stationed in the Sinai for as long as Israel deemed necessary.

That the neighboring Arab countries will accept Israel's existence and refrain from warlike acts like terror, shelling, incursions, etc.

A Raw Nerve - Israel's Pre-1967 Security Concerns

On February 22, 1967, that is about three months before the Six Day War, Yigal Allon¹ made a presentation, surveying Israel's security situation. Following are some quotes from there²:

"In my coming speech I want to prove that Israel is entitled, nay, obligated - and therefore also capable of opening preemptive hostilities whenever war is imposed upon it, this being the most important and, in certain circumstances, the only means of securing its survival".

"There are six possible scenarios that entitle or, rather, compel Israel to go to war:

In case of offensive troops concentrations that endanger Israel.

When it becomes certain that the enemy is preparing a surprise air strike against Israel air bases.

If our nuclear facilities and research centers will be subjected to a pinpoint air strike.

If the guerrilla, mining and terror shelling will reach such proportions that will render our passive defense and retaliatory raids inadequate.

If Jordan will conclude a military pact with another

Arab country and will permit the concentration of foreign forces within its borders, and especially west of the Jordan River.³

If Egypt will blockade the Tiran (Sharm-el-Sheikh) Red Sea passage".

"...the method that may be used by the enemy in a surprise, Blitz-Krieg type war, taking the following actions:

A surprise air strike against the Israeli Air Force, catching it on the ground⁴.

A simultaneous ground offensive on a number of fronts, covered and supported by an Air

Force which enjoys full air superiority (see a. above).

Seaborne landings, be it with limited objectives like harassment, disruption or diversion of forces or even a large scale invasion or large scale guerrilla operations or even the use of parachutists or seaborne infiltration in the rear, whose objectives will be to spread confusion and harass transportation⁵.

Air and sea bombardment of urban and industrial concentrations.

Such a Blitz-Krieg war or anything similar will aim to accomplish facts before a full (Israel) general mobilization and before an international intervention will, if it will, materialize to achieve a cease fire".

An Israeli victory means demands for peace and cooperation and meant, in the past, the consolidation of defensive positions to answer further threats.

An Arab victory means, as blunt as it sounds, national and even personal extermination.⁶

Analysis of a Crushing Victory - June 1967 - A preempting air strike reviewed

Prevailing Circumstances

The 1956 Sinai Campaign was fought jointly with the British and French forces that (although their ground forces' achievements were far from brilliant) carried much of the burden of air superiority. When air superiority was secure, air-to-ground warfare proved to be a merciless, deadly weapon in the desert, especially when the anti-aircraft weapons were relatively primitive.⁷

When a number of days into the war, the Soviets threatened the British, French and Israelis with a nuclear strike unless fire ceases immediately and the angry Eisenhower Administration did not par the threat⁸, the fire had to cease. Having achieved all its objectives in four days, Israel was ready, even content, to oblige and negotiate. As against it, the Anglo-French, whose cumbersome moves prevented them from occupying the length of the Suez Canal, their objective, before the Soviet ultimatum matured, had to capitulate, not being in a position to negotiate. They lost the battle.

The conclusion, applied when planning the coming contingency, was that when fighting a conventional war in a theater of super-power active interest, a military decision had to be reached as close to the opening moves as possible, within a maximum of 10-14 days before a super-power nuclear threat, unchecked by another side, could become real, having run its warning, weighing, decision-making, readiness and ultimatum course.⁹

In the existing circumstances, Ygal Allon was proven right. Israel had no choice but to preempt when threatened, or risk its very existence.

If a decisive victory had to be achieved within the shortest possible span of time (see above Prevailing Circumstances), the choice of arena was crucial: nothing would do but going simultaneously for the "jugulars" of the 25 top priority targets, when the fate of the war would be decided. The "jugulars" were the runways whose cratering would prevent the main body of the enemy Air Force from taking off (special armaments, among others, the French Matra Durandal, were conceived and forged to Israeli Air Force definition).¹⁰

The bomb load of the Israeli attacking force would be critically limited because of fuel loads required by ranges to targets, especially when flying low under radar coverage (which is most wasteful on fuel) and when requiring a reserve for possible air-to-air engagement and breakaway upon returning. Intensive training, superb intelligence data, runs on models and personal target allocation, with photos and procedures memorized, helped overcome the scarcity of armament.¹¹

Targets were to be hit simultaneously, by order of priority, in a way that mutual support, i.e., one air base's aircraft defending the (other) one attacked, was rendered impossible as far as conditions would allow, through meticulous timing. Back up formations sent to ascertain kill, had secondary and tertiary targets allocated if/when their back-up missions became redundant due to successful first runs.

Where/when runways were put out of commission, strafing runs were to be made by the attacking fighters to destroy anti-aircraft artillery and as many enemy aircraft on the ground as possible.

SIGINT and post-strike photo reconnaissance (including the strafing aircraft's gun camera) were to be put to efficient use to prevent escape of unhurt targets or duplication of attacks.

Electronic warfare, in its infancy, was to be used as a supplement to special missile suppression/diversion sorties allocated.

Upon inflicting mortal damage to the enemy air forces, which was assumed to require about two days, a significant percentage of missions were to be diverted to ground forces support. Until then, the ground forces would enjoy the theater air superiority, i.e., freedom of movement achieved by the air bases attack, and receive occasional support when acutely required, or when free missions were available. 44 Fouga Magister, light jet trainers, were earmarked for ground support. They fought valiantly with insufficient armaments and suffered heavy losses.

Spread so thin, the only home air defense detail were four Mirage aircraft.

Losses were calculated to be 3 percent per sortie. The calculations were unfortunately, accurate.

When the war did break out and the stunning news of the total collapse of the Egyptian Air Force reached the Egyptian GHQ in a quick sequence of disastrous reports, Marshall Hakim Amer, Nasser's deputy and Minister of Defense, ordered a general ground forces withdrawal from the Sinai,¹² be it in order to prevent their eventual total annihilation or in order to achieve a political stalemate. The story of the Israeli outnumbered ground forces' valiant and successful combats in hot pursuit that crushed the Egyptian forces sent to reoccupy Sinai, as that of the battles for the Golan, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem do not belong to this review, having taken place in the aftermath of decision, that is after a barely cliff-hanging Israel turned the tables by one masterly air strike.

The elaborated description of the Israeli Air Force's conditions and deeds, is hereby presented for two reasons:

The new Soviet re-supplied aircraft were dispersed in hardened, well separated shelters. Additional runways were built.

Radar coverage gaps were, as a rule, closed also at low altitude.

Anti-aircraft defense made a quantum jump:

Even a war wise government like Israel's can err at a crucial moment. Errors are human. The country's defense/deterrence establishment should prevent such a mistake from becoming a death warrant (see para. 2.4).

Israel has to conduct a sincere, aggressive enlightenment campaign,¹⁸ especially in the U.S., to reduce diplomatic "friendly fire" in crucial moments. Israel has a case. It has never been pleaded with vehemence and vigor.

Israeli leaders have to learn to live with U.S. pressure when necessary and bear the consequences rather than lose lives or endanger the country's existence. As Allon said, given the circumstances in the Middle East and the danger of extermination if it is going to lose a war, democratic, peace seeking Israel should be free to preempt when war with a neighboring dictatorship is about to break at the dictator's initiative.

All defense planning in the Middle East¹⁹ has to cater to the "worst case" scenario unless absolutely certain that this is not the case. The Yom Kippur evaluation of the situation did the opposite.

The improvement in the balance of power between Israel and the Arabs could not compensate for the loss of initiative to the Arabs.

Types upgraded from T.34 and Stalin of WWII vintage, to T.55 and T.62 in 1973 and then, at present, to upgraded T.55, T.62, T.72 and T.72M or the U.S. M1A1.

Tank cannons grew in caliber from 75mm to high speed 120mm using highly sophisticated ammunition.

Tank turrets became gyrostabilized to enable firing in movement.

GPS is being introduced for totally independent navigation and positioning.

Most important: Passive infrared night vision equipment has converted armor into a 24 hours/day fighting force, thus adding about 30 percent to its war making capability.

More powerful engines, better armor, better human engineering, more reliability and faster maintenance are to be counted among the added features.

Types upgraded from MiG-15, 17, 19, 21 or Su-7 of the Six Day War (June 1967) to later types MiG-21, Su-20, etc. in 1973 and MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-29 or Su-24, etc. that improved the quality of later platforms of Russian manufacture. F-16 A,B,C,D as well as F-15 of U.S. manufacture are top of the line platforms. The top speed bracket remained the same, i.e., around Mach 2 at altitude, clean aircraft, to sonic speed when flying low or subsonic when carrying underslung stores such as bombs or auxiliary fuel tanks.

One of the revolutionary improvements in air combat technology has been the introduction of the WDNS (Weapons Delivery and Navigation Systems) whose readings are presented on a pilot's HUD, i.e. Head-up Display. An illustration of one of the improvements in aiming achieved through the use of WDNS cum HUD is the accuracy of ("dumb") iron bombs release. While in training, a pilot may achieve, flying over a known firing range, by a fix set of rules, an accuracy of 30 mR C.E.P. ²¹ when aiming "the old way". In combat, where ranges, speeds, altitudes, dive angles and speeds are played havoc with by anti-aircraft fire or other distractions and the target has to be identified, the 30 mR look more like 300, especially to non-veteran pilots. Equipped with WDNS + HUD, any pilot who operates the system properly, will hit with an accuracy of 6.5-7.0 mR (mili-Radian angular precision). This system alone, is a force multiplier of between 4 and 8 or more, depending on the pilot's experience.

The second revolutionary improvement is that of passive night, infra-red vision, FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red). Although some night attacks were carried out by combat aircraft before FLIR, using parachuted flares, this was a complicated procedure, used mostly (if not only) by the Israelis, with the illumination being unsteady, incomplete and uni-directional.

Stand off guided weapons of a multitude of varieties of sizes and ranges and Cluster Bomb Units (C.B.U.) are a quantum jump in armament technology, as are the multitude of short, medium and long range air-to-air missiles.

The end result of the changes enumerated in above (i) to (iv) is that:

Without going into further technical details, it may be safely concluded that one 1997 combat aircraft is, in terms of its strike capability, more than a match to a whole squadron of 1967 or even 1973 vintage combat aircraft - this in a region almost ideal in its geography and climate for the conduct of aerial warfare. ²²

The "lonely" SAM-2 of 1967 was joined in 1973 by the SAM-3 high performance medium altitude, by the lethally efficient SAM-6 low and medium altitude, mobile missile and by the "Strella", SAM-7 shoulder fired, infra-red homing infantry missile.

Later, apart from the improved technology, density, proper positioning and C3I of the above mentioned veterans, the Middle East has received the SAM-5, for extreme range and altitude, the SAM-10, SAM-12 to SAM-17, etc.

Israel is presently surrounded by the densest most sophisticated and most efficient missile air defense system in existence anywhere.0;

The by far most dramatic addition to the Middle East arsenal surrounding Israel are the ballistic missiles that "came of age" in grand style, especially since the Gulf War of 1991. During the Six Day War of 1967 there were no ballistic missiles launched. The Egyptian effort of 1962-64 to develop a German V-2 derivative (as is the SCUD) with the help of German rocket scientists withered when thwarted by Israel (which took measures against the scientists) and by other interventions.

Throughout the Yom Kippur War of 1973, some Frog missiles were launched by Syria and some Frog and Kelt (cruise) missiles were launched by Egypt. Ballistic missiles were hardly mentioned, if at all in IISS 1973 documentation. The scarcity of Western, including Israeli, intelligence on the ballistic missiles development status, quantities and operational readiness in Arab countries was displayed during the Gulf War. Not much is known of about what happened before 1991.

For instance, IISS data on Syria, 1973, makes no mention of Syrian Frog-2 or Frog-7, although some were launched at Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It also lacks all information on Egyptian cruise Kelt missiles that were fired at Israel.

However, the Jaffe Center report of 1994-95, based on 1992-93 data, mentions under the "Defense Production" heading (p. 196), the existence of a SCUD B SSM manufacturing facility in Egypt, operating with North Korean assistance.²³ That same report discloses an intensive manufacturing and inventory build-up effort of ballistic missiles as well as the existence of a conventional, chemical and bacteriological warheads production facility in Syria.

The present day ground-to-ground ballistic missiles inventory ready to be launched at Israel from Egypt (Iraq?), Syria and Saudi Arabia seems to be about 1,000 to 1,500 SCUDs (or others).

The TBM (Theater Ballistic Missiles) are, as of 1995 or 1996, considered Main Battle Weapons by Syria and Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority is to include the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, i.e. all the Palestinian Arabs that are neither Israeli nor Jordanian citizens.

Were Israel to shrink to its 1967 borders, with or without any minor modifications, they will become an (extremist) entity bordering with Jordan and, if one remembers 1958, 1968 or 1970, will most probably be out to "unify the country" again.

If before 1967, the Hashemite throne held the Judea and Samaria Palestinians on a tight rein, unarmed, with no universities and a rudimentary economy to prevent them from overwhelming Jordan, the Palestinian Authority emerging at the end of this century will be well armed, with ten universities or colleges and an economic start-up.

Were any Arab-Israeli war situation to develop, the Palestinian Authority will certainly pitch in to exact additional concessions from Israel.

This will complicate matters enormously, like for instance, if Jordan will be occupied by Syrian, Iraqi or Saudi troops, or the three of them, ²⁵ with the Palestinian Authority's help, creating an untenable situation for Israel.

It may be stated that, while during the 1967 war, the Arabs of Judea and Samaria (and Gaza) were passive onlookers, during a possible war from the 90's on, they should be reckoned with as an active, armed enemy element.

• Dictionaries define peace as:

Firepower;

Mobility;

Terrain. ³¹

The mightiest concentration of forces per mile of frontier or per (its own) square mile the world has ever seen, numerically and even qualitatively superior to the Allied Forces that invaded Normandy in June 1944, as strange as this statement sounds. ³²

The emergence of a de facto independent Palestinian Authority that, apart from anti-Israeli irrident activities, will most probably be engaged, in alliance/collusion with Iraq or Syria, in the dismembering of Jordan, i.e. the deployment of Iraqi or Syrian (or Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi) forces along the Jordan and then, to be expected, along the Palestinian Authority's demarcation lines with Israel (whose width will be, at critical places, some 9-10 miles in all).

Egypt reneging on its peace agreement with Israel and joining a Syrian, Iraqi (Iranian) anti-Israeli coalition.

A degradation of the Middle East political situation toward Islamic fundamentalism or other outcome of an ever-increasing gap between the West's (including Israel's) constantly improving standard and quality of life and the standard and quality of life in the Arab countries, overburdened as they are by defense outlays.

A degradation of the (conventional) military existing balance with the overtaking of the Israeli technological advantage, as is the case with FLIR, WDNS + HUD or GPS.

A degradation of the non-conventional military situation brought about by the "nuclearization" of the surrounding dictatorships in addition to the standard inclusion of chemical and/or biological weapons in Arab arsenals.

A terror situation³³ whose intensity will increase with the deterrence deficiency created by enhancing the Arab forces and by the grossly diminished Israeli force through loss of vital strategic ground.