B”H
REPORT ON THE ACQUIESCENCE OF
THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY FIRST
STRIKE PREPARATIONS IN YESHA:
BRDM2 with Insignia of The Palestinian
Authority.
The IDF continues
to deny the existence of BRDM2’s in Ramallah. See
inside.
updated May 17, 1999
by Mordechai Sones
Nachliel, Israel
first
strike: Surprise assault to which the victim is
unable to mount counterattack because attacker has destroyed or pre-empted his
retaliatory capacity.
SUMMARY: Two years ago, the author began work on an
independent assessment of the PA military capability in Yesha. In the course of this study, reports began
to surface that the PA military may be acquiring the specialized equipment,
units, and training for an overnight first strike against the Jewish
communities of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (Yesha).
The three major sources of information indicating the
possibility of a first strike have been as follows:
1) Eyewitness
reports from a network of Yesha residents concerned about security;
2) Briefings,
statements and leaks from IDF officials, the Yesha Council (Moetzet Yesha),
and the Prime Minister’s office, dealing with reports of a first strike
capability;
3) Independent
assessment by a visiting military professional experienced in first strike
operations.
Indicators of a first strike
include 122 confirmed or suspected armored vehicles in PA hands, rehearsals for
night attack near yishuvim, and gathering of specialized intelligence by Arab
laborers on the yishuvim. The number of
armored vehicles indicates a capability for an overnight first strike on about
40 yishuvim.
The actions and statements
of the IDF may indicate an official willingness to conduct a sudden
“humanitarian” evacuation of an additional thirty or forty yishuvim shortly
after an Arab first strike. Thus in one
quick blow, approximately 2/3 of the yishuvim could be taken off the map:
1) Arab Militia and Paramilitary Training in
Judea and Samaria:
Recent
Events & Actions by PA:
Starting in late 1997, widespread night fire around outlying yishuvim
began. Later, in July through September
of 1998, daytime fire also occurred. In
October the firing tapered off to solely nighttime firing.
Senior PA officials announced that “we have succeeded in providing military training to thousands” for an
attack against yishuvim.[1]
Observations and Analysis of PA Gunfire by Visiting Military Advisor:
In November and December of
1998, a visiting military advisor travelling throughout Yesha analyzed the
pattern of firing taking place in various locations. He noticed a burst of initial small arms fire from a number of
weapons, followed by ten minutes of sporadic shooting. According to the advisor, this pattern of
fire corresponds to the brief, intense burst of shooting that normally takes
place during training for a final assault on an objective at night, followed by
roughly ten minutes of sporadic gunfire while consolidating the objective. Although only the assault portion is
audible, he added, this may actually be the final few minutes that would
conclude two to six hours of silent approach to an objective under the cover of
darkness.
Observations and Analysis of PA Training by Lt.
Col. (res.) Yigal ben-David, Dec. 6, 1998:
“The invasion into Ariel
yesterday, Shabbat, with the support of the Palestinian Authority, is without
doubt part of a general plan to strike at the yishuvim, this time as a
"dry-run" exercise. I have no
doubt that these issues are known to you [Defense Minister Yitzchak Mordechai]
and to the IDF…. Their "police" forces (the name which is still
stubbornly used to describe their army) comprise several divisions which
include a number of battalions which are training to conquer yishuvim in Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza.”
Report from Military Intelligence Source in Shechem Area:
Three 2,000 man Arab paramilitary brigades
(6,000 troops) have been trained to initiate attacks on three yishuvim in the
Shechem area.
Importance:
A simultaneous night or pre-dawn attack would present Yesha with a fait accompli of 40 fallen yishuvim by sunrise.
Official
Response:
When yishuv residents throughout Yesha reported the widespread instances of PA weapons fire, the IDF claimed that these were Arab “weddings.”
2) Arab Commando Forces Already in Position:
Recent
Events & Actions by PA:
There is confirmation of a
300 man Arab commando battalion in Shechem, a commando training camp in
Jericho, and another commando unit at Arafat’s headquarters in Gaza. Additionally, there is a credible report of
a commando unit (Force 17) based in Hevron.
There are also indicators of commando units in additional locations.
Importance:
Existing Arab commando units may spearhead much larger less trained PA armed militias in a surprise assault on Yishuvim.
Analysis:
The first overt military
action taken as part of the Soviet first strikes on Prague (’68), Kabul (’79),
and Vilna (’91) was Soviet commandos breaking down the door and taking over the
control tower of the main airport at 11PM to open the way for troop entry and
air landings of more commandos. In all
three cases the Soviet commando mission included the seizure of key leaders and
the elimination of communications, striking at the nerve center to paralyze the
targeted military structure. There are
indicators that such targets on yishuvim are being identified - see section #4
on Arab labor below.
The intelligence reports from Shechem may indicate the likely way that PA commando units would combine with Arab militias. Each of the three companies from the Shechem commando battalion could spearhead each of the three aforementioned Arab brigades. The commando companies would lead the initial entry, shooting the gate guard and then taking out the communications, alarms, and key leaders. That would leave the followup brigade to deal with the rest of the population.
Official
Response:
Utilizing information
provided by the author, residents of a yishuv near Shechem in late November
1998 confronted IDF Shomron Area Brigade Commander Col. Yehuda Shaked with the
existence of PA commando units and PA armored personnel carriers. The Brigade Commander, unprepared to be
asked tough, informed questions in front of a town meeting, attempted to double
talk his way out of admitting this threat (“But the BTR-152’s are just
trucks….Yes, the PA has them, but not here - somewhere else…”). Rather than initially answering regarding
the 300 commandos in Shechem, the Colonel was more interested in ascertaining
the source who leaked the information.
In the end, Shaked’s stammering unravelled for all to see, and he
explicitly admitted the existence of the 300 man commando unit - letting the residents
of that community understand that the IDF had been holding back information
having life and death relevance to them.
3) PA Armored Vehicles:
Recent
Events & Actions by PA:
The PA currently has
acquired 14 mechanized BRDM2 platoons (42 BRDM2’s), 50 BTR-152 armored
personnel carriers, and a platoon of 30 flatbed trucks which have been reported
transporting tracked armored vehicles.
Twenty-five BTR-152’s with
12.7mm machine guns mounted on them arrived into the PA from Egypt in 1996, and
25 more were reported arriving in 1997.
Importance:
Because the IDF limits yishuv
self defense to small arms, the growing armor vehicle capability of the PA
would render the assault troops it carries invulnerable to yishuv
defenders. The IDF gate guards do not
have anything to stop these vehicles.
The standard sliding gates for all yishuvim would buckle under the
impact of such armored vehicles.
For a more detailed explanation of yishuv vulnerability to Arab armored
personnel carriers, see addendum: “Arab
Armored Vehicles in Yesha: The Threat”.
Analysis:
The PA armored vehicle force
is not capable of challenging the IDF, but would be unstoppable in a first
strike on yishuvim. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that that is their purpose.
Although it is possible to
gain sudden entry into yishuvim by using commandos or even less prepared troops
- as the examples of Ariel[2]
and Ofra[3]
show - armored vehicles provide a rapid capability to do so that ground troops
cannot match.
Official Responses:
The most significant official
response is the IDF refusal to provide anti-tank weapons for yishuv self
defense. So far as we can tell, not a
single anti-tank weapon has been provided to yishuv defenders or to any of the
IDF gate guard contingents assigned to the yishuvim.
On December 9, 1998, the
author contacted Moetzet Yesha for their assessment of the PA armored vehicle
threat. They claimed to know nothing of
PA armored vehicles, and referred the author to Michael Freund in Prime
Minister Netanyahu’s office who, according to Moetzet Yesha, is their contact
for such issues. Mr. Freund also
claimed to have no knowledge of PA armored vehicles, and would only discuss the
illegal numbers of PA forces. Although
Oslo allows the PA 42 BRDM2’s, Moetzet Yesha and the Prime Minister’s office
still would not admit their existence.[4] Apparently, Moetzet Yesha and the Prime
Minister’s office were either intent on suppressing information about PA
armored vehicles or were so out of touch that they were not aware of the 42
light armored vehicles authorized by Oslo.[5]
IDF Response to Ma’ariv Report of Armored Vehicles:
About ten days later, Ma’ariv ran an expose' of the PA armored forces (Dec
18`98). The IDF Spokesman tried to
downplay some of the vehicles identified in the article and denied the
existence of others. But the IDF Spokesman did not even address the most
serious alleged armored threat: the
fifty BTR-152 armored vehicles. Yet according to the aforementioned IDF
documents, the IDF knew about BTR-152 vehicles in PA hands since 1996.
Repeated IDF Denials of BRDM2
Armored Vehicles in Ramallah:
In Ma'ariv of December 18, 1998, the IDF
Spokesman, attempting to refute a report of BRDM2’s in Ramallah: "As far as we know the Palestinians
have 42 armored vehicles of the BRDM variety, all of which are stationed in
Gaza."
In April, 1999, security
officials from the Benjamin regional council requested a meeting with the IDF
to discuss Arab first strike capability.
The officials were told by the IDF area Brigade Commander Col. Gal
Hirsch that the IDF is preparing for that very scenario, but that yishuvim in
the Benjamin area face no danger, as the PA has no armored vehicles in
Ramallah.
Although the IDF Brigade
Commander of Benjamin in 1999 and the IDF spokesman in December 1998 would
admit to 42 BRDM2's only in Gaza, IDF documents as far back as 1996 identified
6 BRDM2's in Ramallah.
Significantly, in November
1998, former IDF Brigade Commander of Benjamin region Col. Yossi Hayman
explained in a briefing that the PA was completing the process of moving its
power infrastructure from Gaza to Ramallah, as Arafat was trying to consolidate
his control and wrest power from Arab extremist elements there. "Therefore," concluded Hayman,
"Ramallah is becoming more and more qualified for hostile terrorist
operations against Israeli targets in the Benjamin area."
The IDF explanation for why
the PA needs armored vehicles according to Oslo is that Arafat needs them to
protect his government from Arab extremist elements.[6] This gives credibility to reports of PA
armor in Ramallah despite IDF denials.
Analysis:
The IDF's repeated denials of Arab armored vehicles in Judea and Samaria appear to be intended to convince those residents that the Arab armor would only threaten to concentrate on yishuvim in Gaza. But evidence of first strike preparations against yishuvim of Judea and Samaria is growing. Thus, the IDF's recurrent attempts to convince some yishuvim to be less concerned because the first strike threat is directed against other yishuvim could represent an attempt to plant false hopes among some of them. Given the evidence of preparations against yishuvim of Judea and Samaria as well, the IDF recurrent attempts to divide yishuv security concerns from one another may reflect a fear of all the yishuvim uniting behind a decision to stand together.
4) Arab Laborers on Yishuvim Detected Performing Intelligence Functions for Surprise First Strike:
Recent Events & Actions by PA:
Files in the Orient House
and other locations contain topographical, logistic, military, and population
information on every Jewish community in Yesha[7]. Arab laborers have been observed noting the
homes of gun owners and potential leaders in each yishuv. Presumably, these reports are also going
into the files of Orient House and would be the key documents used by the Arab
commandos spearheading an assault.
Importance:
The above mentioned
intelligence gathering procedures would give the Arab commandos the information
they need to paralyze yishuv defenses within minutes of smashing through the
gates.
Analysis:
Yishuv residents, concerned
about the security of their families, frequently discuss the presence of
numerous Arab laborers on yishuvim.
Arab preparations to use laborers for a daytime first strike would be
much different than the preparations required for a first strike at night. So the pattern of their preparations bears
close observation as a way to determine what they may be planning:
Possible Arab Laborer Role in Day Assault:
During the day in several
outlying, small yishuvim, most of the men who are armed are away at work and
the Jewish population consists of women and children. Of those left behind during the day, few have weapons except for
IDF guards with M16 rifles at the gate.
Due to the flawed gate and perimeter security of yishuvim, Arab laborers
would have no problem smuggling arms and ammunition inside. They could then easily overcome the two gate
guards, take the arms room, and use the women and children as hostages. (Some yishuvim have banned Arab laborers,
but the vast majority have not.)
Possible Arab Laborer Role in Night Assault:
The yishuv residents would be
asleep. PA militia around the yishuvim
can be mobilized under the cover of darkness to bring their manpower advantage
to bear. Armored vehicles or commandos
approaching the yishuvim would be harder to detect. The night-vision equipment in PA hands would allow the armored
vehicles to approach the yishuvim without using headlights. The Arab laborers, knowledgeable of yishuv streets and buildings, would be attached
to lead elements of the assault forces, directing them to vital targets in the
yishuv. Vital targets include the arms
room, alarm systems, buildings with communications equipment, and the homes of
key leaders and gun owners.
Possible PA Decision for Night Assault Could Change
in the Future:
Given the aforementioned PA night assault training and equipment, a decision for a night assault may be currently in effect. However, the ease with which a hidden Arab arms cache could be planted on a yishuv for use a short time later could make a day assault feasible.
Official Response:
IDF countermeasures on
laborers are badly misdirected or nonexistent.
Some yishuvim even have Arab guards “guarding” the Arab workers. In many yishuvim, the IDF relies on ineffective
“window dressing” security measures to give an illusion of security when in
reality there is none. The author photographed and
videotaped dozens of illegal Arab laborers freely entering holes in fences of yishuvim
from nearby Arab settlements under PA jurisdiction, while IDF guards put on a
show of checking magnetic ID cards at the main gates.
Additionally, thousands of
illegal Arab laborers daily circumvent IDF roadblocks utilizing dirt roads in
places such as Kiryat Sefer, Bet Lechem, Tzurif, Kalkilya, Ramot, and tens of
others. This way, weapons could be
smuggled back and forth from Gaza to Judea and Samaria and also into Israel
within the green line.
When confronted with this
problem by the author, IDF Benjamin Area Brigade Commander Col. Yossi Hayman
admitted that the State of Israel needs those illegal laborers because of a
shortage of manpower. He then said that
he considers the IDF roadblocks which the dirt roads circumvent to be “like
doors without walls….”, and that “the IDF simply does not have the means to
deal with the problem.”
Officials in charge of
security frequently point out that their priority is to provide the local
Jewish residents with the “feeling of security.” The creation of the “feeling of security” has replaced authentic
security, which has apparently gone by the wayside.
Overall Analysis:
Lt. Col. (res.) Yigal
ben-David’s Assessment of IDF Policy;
Dec. 6, 1998:
“The current state of affairs
spells out an abandonment of the yishuvim by the defense establishment and
plays into the hands of the Palestinian Authority and its plans. I assume that you [Minister of Defense Yitzchak
Mordechai] are aware of this dire situation.”
A Possible PA Approach:
Politically, the PA forces
would probably be directed to hold back from a massacre of the Jewish
residents. Their orders would likely be
to hold the residents under gunpoint until “humanitarian” IDF truck convoys
arrive to evacuate them after daylight.
However, even assuming that such discipline could be imposed upon the PA
army forces, the larger armed civilian militias may not heed such constraints.
Barak’s Nine Part Security Policy for Yesha
Inherited from Netanyahu:
Despite the establishment of
an Arab army in Yesha, the Israeli government has maintained nine policies
toward yishuv security. Taken together, the nine policies present a pattern
which could indicate an official policy that would not protect the yishuvim
effectively against a PA first strike assault:
1) Not a single anti-tank weapon allowed to any yishuv to stop PA
armor.
2) Denial of sufficient amounts of ammunition
to yishuvim. The ammunition
provided to each yishuv is enough for several minutes of combat.
3) A pattern of official suppression of information about the
PA's specific first strike capabilities; e.g. armored forces, commando units,
and night attack training. While
occasionally publicizing information about the emerging PA threat, official and
semi-official agencies such as Moetzet Yesha seem to avoid or evade any
specific mention of first strike capability.
They were generally willing to discuss large scale shipments of small
arms, heavy weapons prohibited by the agreements, and other violations by PA,
but when it came to first strike capability, the official answer always seems
to consist of denial, avoidance, or silence.
4) There is no means for mutual support between yishuvim: The yishuvim do not have the equipment,
training, or organization to communicate with neighboring yishuvim to provide early
warning and coordinate defenses.
They do not possess weapons of sufficient range to mutually support each
other. In the current situation, the
yishuvim could be isolated and overrun piecemeal.
5) Proposed security barrier plan for yishuvim may heighten
vulnerability: The IDF and Moetzet
Yesha propose erecting security barriers, purportedly to improve yishuv
security.
The barriers expand the
security perimeters far beyond the numerical strength of available yishuv
defenders to cover their perimeter with overlapping fire, making the barriers
an indefensible trap for yishuv defenders in case of an attack. If the defenders withdraw to an inner
defense perimeter, then the outer barriers would provide the Arabs with a
control measure with which to deploy Arab troops on line for the final assault,
in addition to providing cover and concealment for attackers to trade fire with
yishuv defenders.[8]
The leaders of the Jewish community of Hevron examined the barrier plan and wrote a five page critique to explain its harmfulness and to encourage yishuvim to reject the plan. Most of them have.
6) Pressuring officials associated with Moezet Yesha and the
civilian military liaisons (“Ravshatzim”) to downplay the threat and
hinder Yishuv residents from taking remedial self-defense steps on their own
initiative.
7) Ineffectual instructions to yishuv residents from Ariel
Sharon and Moetzet Yesha officials after Wye:
Ariel Sharon suggested that yishuv residents should “seize the high
ground…” around the yishuvim to “create facts on the ground” to determine what
the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty will be in the final status stage. Meanwhile, officials from Moetzet Yesha and
Benjamin regional council invited yishuv residents to a briefing within the
framework of the “Forum of West Benjamin Yishuvim,” at which the spokesman
presented colorful charts and maps tailored for each yishuv, depicting areas of
“state land” for them to seize. Thus,
officials of both the Israeli government and Moetzet Yesha were sending yishuv
residents outside of the yishuvim while denying them the means to defend what
they already have. These self-defeating
instructions, while doing nothing to improve Yesha's security, do have
practical effect, however: They serve
to strain Yesha's overstretched defenders even further.
One consequence of these
instructions may be manifest outside Israel:
This April, an associate of the author discussed the settler issue with
a knowledgeable lobbyist for the pro-Israel AIPAC lobby in the halls of the
U.S. Congress. When he brought up the
looming danger to yishuv survival, the AIPAC official answered, “the only time
we pay attention to settlers is when they seize territory.”
Apparently, among Israel’s
overseas friends, reports of settler seizure of territory are used to remind
them of how settlers damage the “peace process.” Meanwhile, AIPAC and other Jews and friends of Israel have not
yet been alerted to the most serious concern:
that the residents of Yesha may soon be cleansed.
8) Insistence on obsolete anti-terrorist scenario. The
scenario calls for a yishuv self-defense sufficient to overcome a small handful
of terrorists holding hostages inside a yishuv. Therefore, the scenario becomes
the basis to equip and train yishuv self-defense forces at a minimal level
which leaves them vulnerable to the real scenario which the IDF refuses to use
- an attack by PA militia and/or armor. The inappropriate IDF scenario provides
a doctrinal basis to deny vital anti-tank weapons to yishuv self-defense. It
also limits yishuv self defense forces to a small size and allows only a
handful of small arms.
The IDF's insistence on the
obsolete scenario makes no sense in terms of actual PA military capabilities
but it makes sense if the intention is to keep yishuvim vulnerable. So far, the
apparent deception has succeeded because the public is not experienced at
analyzing scenarios and has found it easier to give Barak and the IDF the
benefit of the doubt.
9) The transformation of the IDF into a gendarme force. By denying the yishuvim the equipment,
training, and resources to defend themselves, Netanyahu and Barak put the bulk
of the responsibility on the IDF. This
dictates tactics, leadership, equipment, and organization which saps the IDF's
morale and resources, undermining its ability to deter or defeat invasion by
foreign armies.
As the gendarme mentality
permeates the soldiers of the IDF, a malaise is beginning to set in. Men who would probably be heroic warriors if
they were given a clear mission, end up being pathetic buffoons as Arab
hoodlums beat them, take away their weapons, and humiliate them in other ways.
The erosion in morale and
resources resulting from this situation is likely to cost lives if Israel goes
to war. This approach may have turned
otherwise patriotic officers against yishuvim which they now see as a strategic
liability. This is particularly ironic,
because if the yishuvim were empowered to defend themselves, they would be a
strategic asset - helping to protect the IDF's back in its mission of holding the Jordan Valley line. Unfortunately, this approach has sewn
hostility between the IDF and the residents of Yesha, instead of allowing them
to function as a strategic team to protect the nation.
There is a common conception that Binyamin Netanyahu
grudgingly made a few more concessions than the electorate would have wanted,
but would not abandon the people of Yesha.
However, the Netanyahu government may have actually
been implementing a policy of abandonment.
Ehud Barak appears to have adopted Netanyahu’s nine
policies, but chosen to emphasize one:
dividing yishuvim against each other.
By declaring some yishuvim to be “safe,” but abandoning others, the
“safe” yishuvim can be lulled into turning their backs on the abandoned
ones. This approach is designed to
prevent what the government fears most:
a unified resolution by the yishuvim to draw the line for Yesha’s
future.
From Netanyahu to Barak, this policy towards Yesha
seems consistent; our challenge is to
alert enough Jews and friends of Israel in time to change it. Publicizing this report on the acquiescence
of the Israeli government and Yesha Council in Arab first strike preparations
could be an effective way to start.
ARAB
ARMORED VEHICLES IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA
The
Threat: Armored vehicles are a particular
threat to the yishuvim because they can easily smash their way through yishuv
gates. The armored vehicles could roam
within the yishuvim because the IDF has withheld anti-armor weapons from yishuv
stockpiles. The IDF also appears to be
withholding information about Arab armored vehicles in Yesha.
BTR-152
The Soviet BTR-152 armored
troop carrier was produced from 1950 to 1960, and has appeared in many variants
and seen action on many fronts, including the Middle East and Afghanistan. The
BTR-152 in Palestinian hands has a mount for the 12.7mm D.Sh.K. heavy machine
gun. It has a 6x6 wheel drive
configuration. It can hold 2 crew
members (driver + commander) and 17 fighters.
The BTR-152 is equipped with night vision equipment for the driver. It weighs 8950 kg and can travel at a speed
of 75 km/h. It's power-to-weight ratio
is 12.29 hp/1000kg making it capable of taking down the gates of any yishuv.
BRDM2
The BRDM-2 is a fully
armored, four-wheel-drive, amphibious reconnaissance vehicle. It has two-pairs of belly wheels and a
centralized tire pressure regulation system for increased cross-country
capability. The BRDM-2 has a box-like
hull with a boat-shaped bow. The engine
is mounted in the vehicle rear and there is a small conical turret mounted on
the hull above the belly wheels. The
driver sits at the front of the hull on the left with the vehicle commander to
his right. To enter the vehicle, the crew
must climb through two roof hatches.
The hull, which is constructed of welded steel, provides the crew with
protection from small arms and shell splinters. The turret, which is very similar to that of the BTR-60PB and
Czechoslovak OT-64, is located in the center of the vehicle and is armed with a
14.5-mm KPVT machine gun with a 7.62mm PKT machine gun. On either side of the hull adjacent to the
crew position, there is a firing port.
Immediately behind the firing port are three vision blocks which protrude
from the outside of the hull, giving some vision to the front and rear of the
vehicle. The belly-wheels are chain
driven and are lowered by the driver and give the BRDM-2 improved cross-country
performance and the ability to cross ditches.
The driver can adjust the tire pressure on all four tires or individual
tires while the vehicle is in motion to adjust to the ground conditions. The BRDM-2 is fully amphibious. It is propelled in the water by a single
water jet at the rear of the hull. The
vehicle has an over-pressure NBC system.
The BRDM-2 is equipped with infrared driving and search lights, a radio
and an inertial land navigation system.
At the front of the vehicle is a winch which has 30m of cable and has a
maximum load of 4000-kg.
Other
armored vehicles residents should learn to recognize because the PA army may have
them already or can easily get them from countries supporting the PA, such as
Egypt or others:
Tracked
vehicles or Half-tracks: White M2 Half-track; BTR-50, PT-76, BMP
Wheeled
armored personnel carriers: BTR-60, OT-62.
COMPARING
RANGE OF PA 12.7mm MACHINE GUN VS. YESHA 7.62mm MACHINE GUN
Machine guns given to Yishuvim are inferior to those in PA hands, giving PA forces standoff capability of close to a kilometer (The point may be moot, though, as the IDF is in the process of removing even the existing machine guns from some yishuv weapons rooms. Additionally, the IDF provides most yishuvim with only approximately 20 minutes of ammunition for a heavy combat situation.) The standoff capability means that even if the yishuvim were able to detect early warning indicators of a first strike and shoulder arms accordingly, they would still be unable to defend themselves. If Arab fire support is untouchable by the weak yishuv defenders, the Arabs can then quickly establish fire superiority - and can suppress the handful of yishuv defenders as Arab commandos and/or militia forces overrun the defensive perimeters. In such an assault, the type of barriers which the IDF has been proposing would serve as one more source of cover and concealment for the attacking forces, and even provide a convenient control measure along which to deploy for the final assault.
|
|
MAXIMUM
RANGE including targets in
defilade |
MAXIMUM
EFFECTIVE RANGE aimed direct fire |
|
7.62mm Browning M1919A4
(0.3 - “Efes Shalosh” (Yesha) |
1.475 km |
1.1 km |
|
12.7mm D.SH.K. or Gurianov
(PA) |
2 km to 3 km |
1.5 km |
|
PA
range advantage over Yesha |
525
to 1525 meters |
400
meters |
|
7.62mm (0.3) Browning M1919A4 (Yishuvim)
|
The penetrating power or
force of the 12.7mm is roughly three times greater than that of the 7.62mm when
compared in accordance with the physics equation (power equals mass times velocity
squared).