(Will his first priority be negotiations with the Arabs or solving Israel's secular-religious divide? The writer, a veteran journalist, comments on current affairs)

The 60 Katyusha rockets fired into the Galilee panhandle and Western Galilee welcomed Ehud Barak on the night of his election as Israel's prime minister. These rockets were a reminder that Barak's agenda will be determined not only by the dossier that he has prepared for his first 100 days, but by external factors not under his
control.

Hizbullah is not willing to wait a year for the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon, the time frame promised by Barak. This fanatical organization is demanding withdrawal now, a hasty retreat which would endanger the lives of those withdrawing, even with the help of the disappointed soldiers from the South Lebanese army. I am sure that Ehud Barak has a plan for what he wants to do during his first 100 days in the social, economic and security spheres. However, he will find it difficult to implement everything at the same time. He will have to prioritize.

In the economic sphere he will need to find resources to fund programs that will help provide jobs for the hundreds of thousands of unemployed; he may even have to raise taxes.

In the social sphere he may need a moratorium of at least a year on working to diffuse secular-religious tensions, since he will need to focus all his attention on negotiations with the Arabs.

With regard to the peace process, it may be too difficult for him to conduct negotiations on all tracks at the same time. He will have to decide whether negotiations with the Palestinians or with Syria are more urgent. He will also have to ensure that renewed talks with the Palestinians do not immediately run aground on three thorny issues: Jerusalem, the "right of return" and safe passage, which the Palestinians have interpreted to mean a road under Palestinian sovereignty within Israeli territory. Nor will this crowded agenda allow a reassessment of a fundamental question: Will it be possible to reach a permanent settlement with the Palestinians within a year? Or perhaps it would be preferable to return to the "step- by-step" approach adopted during the Rabin-Kissinger period, leaving the most complex issues to the end of the negotiating process rather than risk stepping on land mines as the talks begin.

If President Bill Clinton had not been in such a hurry to fix December 1999 as the target date for an Israel- Palestinian summit in Washington to conclude the negotiations on the permanent settlement; if Dennis Ross had not been so hasty in announcing an imminent trip to Jerusalem aimed at jump-starting the peace negotiations, Barak could have used some creative initiative to inject some momentum into the peace process without immediately determining its outcome.

For example, Barak could invite Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Abdullah and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat to a summit meeting in Jerusalem, to discuss the method of negotiations, while at the same time preparing some impressive concessions towards the Syrians or Palestinians which would serve as fodder for the conference's discussions.

Although it is doubtful that they would respond to such an invitation, it would nevertheless be seen internationally as a sign of Israel's intention to preserve the momentum of the peace process, while giving time for re-appraising the tactics necessary for obtaining the desired peace.

THE election results have raised Arab expectations, probably to a level beyond what the new government can accommodate. Logic necessitates that a dam should be erected to block the flood of exaggerated Arab demands, which would result in an immediate breakdown of the Israel- Palestinian negotiations.

A national-unity government is a fair way of signaling to the Arabs that there is a national consensus on the subject of Jerusalem and on not returning to the 1967 borders.

Coalition calculations, however, do not conform with the logic of peace negotiations. The chances of forming such a broad coalition are slim, particularly because this is the first time in many years that the two largest parties together do not have a Knesset majority. They need the support of satellite parties who are in conflict with one another, particularly over religious and ethnic issues. Barak has won an impressive victory, although he has little room to maneuver in forming the government. He must resist attempts to change the law to allow him more than 18 ministers, since a larger cabinet may make it difficult to function. When he was chief of General Staff, Barak once said that he dreamed of a smaller, more sophisticated army; if he could not implement it in the IDF, he should at least try to do so in his cabinet. A government with a large number of ministers is not necessarily a more effective one. More ministers means more expeditures. If Ehud Barak decides that the peace process will be the focus of his activity in coming months, rather than having his government wallow in attempts to solve the eternal problems of the Jewish people, he will have to set up his cabinet in a manner that will make it clear to our neighbors that this prime minister will not divide Jerusalem, and so they understand that Israel is renewing negotiations, not to accept dictates from the Palestinians but to seek a fair compromise.